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CASE NOTES
EXTENDED IMMUNITY FOR WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION INSURER: STATE
COMPENSATION INSURANCE
FUND v. SUPERIOR COURT
OF SISKIYOU COUNTY
(CAL. 1965)
Under the workmen's compensation laws, an employee who has
been injured during the course of employment has a right to recover
from his employer's insurer, regardless of the employee's own negli-
gence.' This being admitted, there is an additional problem when
the insurer undertakes to inspect the work premises and negligently
fails to perform its duties. In such a case, the question is whether
the employee who was injured as a result of the negligent inspection
has a common law cause of action against the insurer. The problem
in California has been resolved in State Compensation Insurance
Fund v. Superior Court of Siskiyou County, a case of first irn-"
2pression.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
Breceda, the real party in interest, brought an action in the
Superior Court of Siskiyou County against his employer's insurance
carrier for negligent inspection of the work premises. In May, 1961,
he was employed by Arcata Lumber Services, Inc., in Siskiyou
County. He suffered injuries when a pile of lumber fell on him while
he was operating a forklift. Breceda subsequently received a com-
pensation award and medical expenses in the proceedings before the
Industrial Accident Commission. These expenses were paid by the
petitioner as Arcata's compensation carrier. Breceda then brought
the challenged superior court action, alleging that his employer's in-
surer had assumed a duty to inspect the premises where Breceda
was working,3 and had either negligently failed to inspect the prem-
1 Workmen's compensation statutes are based on a new theory of compensation
which is distinct from the prevailing theories of damages. They do not rest on any
theory of wrongful conduct or negligence on the part of the employer. Some courts
have gone so far as to say that these laws were enacted with the deliberate purpose of
changing the legal relationships of the parties involved in accidents arising out of and
in the course of workingmen's employment as they existed under the common law.
See SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 6 (3d ed. 1941).
2 237 A.C.A. 499, 46 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1965).
a The contract provision was: "State Compensation Insurance Fund . .. does
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ises, or in inspecting them, had performed the act negligently,
thus proximately causing Breceda's injuries. The plaintiff-employee
contended that the duty to inspect was a duty in addition to the
carrier's usual obligations as insurer. It was further alleged by
Breceda that the obligation thus assumed by the carrier was not
only for the benefit of plaintiff's employer, Arcata, but also for the
benefit of the employees of Arcata.
The carrier demurred on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction, claiming that the Industrial Accident Commission had
exclusive jurisdiction. The court overruled the demurrer and the
carrier brought the present petition for a writ of prohibition. The
issue which the district court was asked to determine was whether an
employee injured in the course of employment can maintain a com-
mon law cause of action for negligence against his employer's com-
pensation insurer, where the negligence of the insurer is a failure
to fulfill its commitments with the employer regarding safety in-
spections. The district court issued the writ of prohibition.
PREVIOUS CALIFORNIA CASES IN COLLATERAL AREAS
In its decision, the Breceda court considered the judicial prece-
dents in collateral areas, primarily because there was no case
directly on point.4 The case of Fitzpatrick v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co.' was cited as a pilot state court decision. In Fitzpatrick, an em-
ployee had suffered a back injury and a cast was applied by his
personal physician; later, the insurer's physician required removal
of the cast, replacing it with another. This so aggravated the injury
that it caused death. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained
against Fitzpatrick's widow on the ground that the superior court
lacked jurisdiction. In affirming the lower court, the California
Supreme Court held that:
... where the recovery for an injury sustained by or the death of an
employee comes within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, the Industrial Accident Commission has exclusive jurisdiction and
the superior court may not entertain an action for damages against
the employer or his insurance carrier, the latter being subrogated to
all the rights and duties of the employer.6
hereby agree .. . (3) To Serve the Insured (a) by the inspection of work places
covered by the Policy when and as deemed desirable by the Fund and thereupon to
suggest to the Insured such changes or improvements as may operate to reduce the
number or severity of injuries during work, and (b) upon notice of injury, by in-
vestigation thereof and by adjustment of any resulting claims in accordance with the
law ......
4 There was no case on point in California where an insurer's failure to perform
a duty, such as failure to inspect the work premises, was the cause of the original
compensable injury.
5 7 Cal. 2d 230, 60 P.2d 276 (1936).
6 Id. at 233, 60 P.2d at 278.
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In Fitzpatrick, the court restated the rule set forth in Sarber v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co.7 There the court pronounced:
. . . [W]e are of the opinion that the original accident was the proxi-
mate cause of the damages in this action, and the State Compensation
Act provides what the Legislature has deemed just and adequate com-
pensation for all such injuries. If we are correct in this conclusion,
there is little room to doubt that the remedy thus provided is exclusive
of all other remedies . . . and that the exclusive provisions of the
Compensation Act cannot be evaded by bringing an action in some
other form or under some other name.8
THE COURT'S REASONING IN THE BRECEDA CASE
In this case of first impression, the court, in effect, was asked
to determine sections 3852 and 3850 of the Labor Code.' In reach-
ing its decision, the court reasoned that the California Legislature
was given the plenary power to create a complete workmen's compen-
sation act under the state's constitution.10 This section of the state
constitution gives the legislature the power to secure safety in
places of employment and to make provisions for regulating in-
surance coverage in all its aspects.
Next, the majority of the court inquired into the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Insurance and Safety Act which be-
came the basis for the Labor and Insurance Codes. This act referred
to the safety provisions and the regulations of the insurance coverage
in all its aspects as initially set forth in the constitution."
From a study of the California Constitution and the Work-
men's Compensation Act, the court concluded that:
The process of insuring thus is made an integral part of the sys-
tem .... Demonstrating that the insurer is an integral part of the
system is the provision made by the Act that whenever the insurer has
acknowledged the existence of its policy and has assumed liability it
is substituted for the employer in all subsequent proceedings. The em-
ployer is thereafter relieved from liability. 12
After a consideration of the relevant sections of the state con-
stitution and the Workmen's Compensation Insurance and Safety
Act, the Breceda court had no difficulty in ruling in favor of the
insurer's interpretation of sections 3852 and 3850 of the Labor Code.
Section 3852 states:
7 23 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1928).
8 Id. at 435. (Emphasis added.)
9 Other sections of the CAL. LAB. CODE were considered briefly by the court,
however, their primary concern was to interpret these two sections.
10 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 21.
11 237 A.C.A. at 503, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
12 Id. at 503-504, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 893-894.
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The claim of an employee for compensation does not affect his
claim or right of action for all damages proximately resulting from
such injury or death against any person other than the employer.'
3
Section 3850 states that: "As used in this chapter: .... (b) 'Em-
ployer' includes insurer as defined in this division."' 4
The carrier argued that if these sections were read together,
then the insurer received the employer's immunity and could not be
a third person subject to a common law cause of action under
section 3852.
Breceda, on the other hand, had argued in the lower court
that: (1) the general definition of "employer" under section 3300's
should be applied in construing section 3601,16 and that sections 3852
and 3850 could be ignored as being intended to have reference only
to subrogation rights and procedure; and (2) when the whole
philosophy of workmen's compensation insurance and safety is
examined, the conclusion would be that actions such as this were
outside the exclusive dominion of the Industrial Accident Commis-
sion. The district court recognized the cogency of Breceda's argu-
ment, but rejected it.
ANALYSIS OF THE BRECEDA COURT'S DECISION
The conclusion of the Breceda court is that when an employer's
compensation insurer contracts to perform an employer's obligation
to make safety inspections, the insurer, in assuming the contracted-
for duty, does not lose its status as an insurer in its relationship with
the employee of the insured employer and become a third person
within the meaning of section 3852, which preserves the employee's
action for damages against any person other than the employer.
From an analysis of the opinion, it becomes clear that the reasoning
of the court can be questioned from several vantage points.
Public Policy
First of all, the overriding consideration in the minds of the
majority of the court was public policy. The court clearly states its
position:
13 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852. (Emphasis added.)
14 Id. at § 3850.
15 This section provides: "As used in this division, 'employer' means: (a) The
State and every State agency. (b) Each county, city, district, and all public and
quasi public corporations and public agencies therein. (c) Every person including
any public service corporation, which has any natural person in service. (d) The legal
representative of any deceased employer." Nowhere in this section is insurer defined
as employer.
16 This section provides: "When the conditions of compensation exist, the right
to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of this division . . . the
exclusive remedy against the employer for the injury or death."
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We are also impressed with the public policy argument that should
the court accept Breceda's posit all compensation carriers would be
compelled either to strike the provision for inspection from their
policies or substantially raise their premiums to cover their exposure
to greater monetary outlays; that working conditions left to the inex-
pert administration of employers, particularly the smaller ones, would
deteriorate and that therefore one of the principal purposes of the
system of workmen's compensation, namely, the fostering of safe work-
ing conditions, would be defeated. In seeking legislative intent the
courts must consider the consequences which will flow from a particular
interpretation.I T
Contrary to this line of reasoning, it has been argued that
there are no overriding policy considerations compelling tort im-
munity for insurers. It has been the position of some observers that
while the employer's insurer does step into the shoes of the employer
with respect to certain of the employer's duties, it by no means
follows that the employer's immunity from tort liability extends
or should extend to the insurer in all situations."' Thus it has been
said:
While it may be true that an insurer supports and furthers the
compensation system by affording a vehicle of protection as an
alternative to a monopolistic state fund or self-insurance, it does so
for purely business reasons and appears to enjoy a quite successful
participation in the scheme. 19
The same writer goes on to say that no inspection might be better
than a negligent inspection since the employer might be prompted
to make a more vigorous effort to provide for job safety.2° Instead
of cessation of safety inspections, the threat of common law liability
should result in increased competence in inspection techniques by
the insurer to ensure that the inspections are not performed in a
negligent manner.2
The Nelson case,22 which fostered the above article, can be
distinguished insofar as the inspection was a gratuitous one and
insofar as Illinois did not have the statutory immunity of California.
Nevertheless, there is certainly some merit in the argument that
public policy is in fact a poor reason for extending employer's im-
munity to the insurer acting as inspector.
17 237 A.C.A. at 507, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
This argument of the court is only true if the insurer is undertaking total inspec-
tion responsibility. However, the insurer could reserve the right to inspect without
undertaking the responsibility to inspect, and thus accomplish what the court seeks
in the present case.
18 Note, 51 VA. L. REV. 347 (1965).
10 Id. at 351.
20 Ibid.
21 Id. at 352.
22 Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 1l. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964).
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Logical Extension of the Rule
Aside from the question of public policy, there is also the prob-
lem of how far such immunity will extend. The court's decision
seems to indicate that the insurer qua inspector has the immunity
of the insured employer. If this is so, the workmen's compensation
law has been extended in such a way that an insurer can at once
act as an inspector, thereby reaping the benefits of such an added
inspection provision, without the concomitant duty attaching.
The majority of the court argued that the very name of the act,
Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act, expresses the
tripartite coverage and are interrelated. Their reasoning seems to be
that since safety is contemplated in the act, the immunity should ex-
tend to safety inspection by the insurer. The majority recognized that
if an employer should contract out the duty to inspect to an indepen-
dent safety engineer, other than his insurer, the safety engineer
would be liable in a court of law for negligent performance of the
contracted-for duty. 8
The Source of the Injury
The final problem which deserves mention is the court's re-
liance on the Fitzpatrick decision and cases which have followed that
line of thinking.24 In using the Fitzpatrick line of reasoning, the
court failed to recognize the very basic difference between it and the
present case under consideration. That is, the Fitzpatrick case
stands for the proposition that aggravation by an insurer of an
existing compensable injury does not place the insurer in the position
of a third party subject to a common law cause of action. It has
been said:
In this situation, of course, any negligence on the part of the in-
surance carrier was not a cause of the original injury, and it is . . .
easier to construe statutory language making the remedy under the
compensation exclusive, as extending to aggravation of the original
injury, no matter through whose fault.25
On the other hand, the present case was one where the employee
was injured in the course of employment, but the negligence of the
carrier contributed to the original compensable injury. The basic
difference in the fact pattern has led other courts in other jurisdic-
tions to find liability on the part of the carrier, absent statutory
immunity.26 If this distinction is recognized, then, absent statutory
23 237 A.CA. at 506, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
24 E.g., Hazelwerdt v. Industrial Indemnity Exchange, 157 Cal. App. 2d 759, 321
P.2d 831 (1958) ; Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172 Cal. App. 2d 731, 342 P.2d 976 (1959).
25 Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 598, 600 (1964).
26 E.g., Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964);
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